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ONTARIO’S ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL CLUSTERS: A
GLASS HALF-FULL OR HALF-EMPTY FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
JUSTICE?
LORNE SOSSIN* AND JAMIE BAXTER**
A INTRODUCTION

As Peter Cane recently observed, far too little attention has been devoted to
administrative justice.1 While in some jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom (UK),
adjudicative tribunals fall under the supervision of the judiciary, in Canada, the Supreme
Court has confirmed that all tribunals, even if their sole task is adjudication, are a
part of the executive branch of government, established by statute to further a
policy objective.2 Governments in Canada continue to experiment with different
organisational models in their attempts to balance the policy mandate of tribunals with
their adjudicative function, while working to improve accessibility for users and the
quality of decision making. By examining the ongoing evolution of tribunal reforms, we
believe both the possibilities and limits of administrative justice may be better
understood.
The provincial government of Ontario in Canada took a revealing first step to
organize its kaleidoscopic system of administrative agencies, boards and commissions
when it proclaimed the Adjudicative Tribunals Accountability, Governance and
Appointments Act (Tribunals Act) in the spring of 2010.3 The Tribunals Act proposes a
novel strategy for structural reform called tribunal clustering, which groups related
tribunals together, but keeps their respective statutory mandates and memberships intact
and encourages them to connect along a range of shared characteristics. The resulting
cluster organisations aim to capture intersections in tribunals’ logistical, procedural,

and substantive adjudicatory features and to reinforce links between constituencies of
tribunal users.
These clusters are taking shape at a time when tribunal system restructuring has
emerged as a priority in several Commonwealth countries. Compared to recent
changes in the UK and to widespread tribunal amalgamations in Australia at both
federal and State levels, Ontario’s clustering model offers a unique strategy for reform—
but one for which the long-term vision remains unclear, or at least it appears to be
incomplete. In this paper we explore the resulting gaps and uncertainties in this
strategy. Using modernisation efforts in Australia and the UK as a counterpoint, we
argue that Ontario’s strategy is founded on a distinctive idea of institutional change
designed to make the tribunal system flexible, more adaptive and thus progressively
more effective at delivering administrative justice services to its users. That said, tribunal
clusters in our view represent an important step but not a final destination.
The need for such change is evident. Claimants who come to administrative
tribunals in Canada, as elsewhere, expecting a convenient forum to resolve their
problems may discover that institutional resources and expertise, their own
knowledge of the system, and their statutory entitlements and legal rights are
fragmented between bodies with diverse norms and mandates. At least from a birdseye view, the tribunal ‘system’ now looks more like an ad hoc assortment of isolated
institutions rather than a coherent system of justice. Increasingly, it seems that the very
structures and modes of organisation behind the delivery of administrative justice
may actually pose barriers for users, even as they separate individual tribunals from the
shared knowledge, practices and infrastructure that a more rational and explicitly
coordinated administrative justice system would have to offer. The challenge now
squarely in front of reformers is to identify suitable approaches to institutional
change that will thread these disparate elements into a more coherent whole.
That challenge is also a reflection of broader trends in the shifting context of

modern governance. As Andrew Gamble and Robert Thomas have recently
observed in the UK:4
Government is certainly not disappearing in the UK or anywhere else, but the context

in

which governments operate has been transformed, as they grapple with profound challenges
arising from globalisation, Europeanisation, the modernisation of the administration and
organisation of government, and an evolving constitution. As a

result of these changes,

governance is becoming more fragmented and diversified and as a result it is much harder for
both politicians and citizens to understand the process of governing.

Ontario shares in the problems that this evolving context raises for the delivery of
administrative justice, but the province’s response has been distinctive, perhaps unique,
compared to strategies enacted elsewhere.
The idea behind tribunal clusters in Ontario traces its origins to the Agency Cluster
Project, launched in 2006 with the appointment of Kevin Whitaker (now Justice
Whitaker of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice) as facilitator to work with five
environmental and land use planning tribunals to explore possibilities for mutual
reforms. The project’s stated purpose was to identify ways to exploit overlaps between
the different tribunals, in order to improve their independence in decision-making, their
effectiveness from a user perspective, and their accountability. A key constraint,
however, was to achieve these objectives without compromising or collapsing the
separate legislative mandates of each constituent tribunal.5 Further, there appeared to be
little appetite in the province for reforms

that would alter the jurisdiction of

participant tribunals, and thus the Cluster Project was limited to operate within
bounds of existing legislative frameworks.
Whitaker’s final report introduced the tribunal cluster as ‘the grouping together of
different tribunals that work in related areas and deal with related subject matter’.6
The goal of clustering, according to the report, was ‘to improve the quality of
services offered to the public by sharing resources, expertise and administrative

and professional support’.7 This original vision for tribunal clusters then emerged in the
Tribunals Act as a surprisingly open-ended idea. Section 15 of the Act provides that
the province may designate two or more adjudicative tribunals as a cluster if ‘the
matters that the tribunals deal with are such that they can operate more effectively and
efficiently as part of a cluster than alone’.8 But a detailed description both of what a
cluster ‘is’ and any specific criteria that describe when it is appropriate to form a
cluster are conspicuously absent from the Tribunals Act. Nor are the rationales behind
the cluster concept clarified in the wording of the Act or by nature of the legislative
scheme overall.9 For these, we find it necessary to look further afield.
Specifically, the austerity of the Tribunals Act as drafted raises a key question going
forward: on what basis should individual tribunals be connected within a cluster? In
other words, how can we predict when tribunals will operate more ‘effectively’ and
‘efficiently’ as part of a cluster than alone? A more complete answer to this question
will be crucial for new cluster organisations as they arise and continue to evolve.
To date, the Tribunals Act has borne two clusters markedly different in
composition: Environment and Land Tribunals Ontario (ELTO) in April 2010, and
Social Justice Tribunals Ontario (SJTO) in January 2011.10 ELTO brings together
five tribunals with overlapping subject matter expertise in land use planning,
assessment and expropriation, heritage conservation, and environmental

regulation.

SJTO encompasses six tribunals responsible for a diverse range of subject matters but
serving a common constituency of users vulnerable to social injustices. Each cluster
operates as an independent organisation and is led by its own Executive Chair. As we
discuss in more detail below, the differences between these two organisations illustrate
that the question of when tribunals should form a cluster is one to be answered with
reference to the tribunals’ existing capacities and to the goals that each particular
cluster is trying to achieve.
That question also leads to—and, to some extent, presupposes—a more basic inquiry

into the systemic challenges that clusters are designed to confront. Are these clusters
in reality just a convenient cost-saving exercise? Certainly, clustering tribunals may give
rise to efficiencies. Rather than four payroll offices or four registrars, a cluster of
four tribunals may need only one payroll office and one registrar. Everything from
renting space to information technology procurement may be more cost effective for
larger clustered tribunals than for smaller individual ones. That said, integrating
disparate systems and equipment may also give rise to short term costs. The key point,
in our view, is not whether clusters are more efficient than individual tribunals
operating in isolation but rather, who benefits? If the savings from clustering are
reinvested in enhancing the quality of administrative justice, then the beneficiaries will
be the tribunals themselves and, more importantly, the parties who come before them.
If, however, savings are siphoned off into general revenues, then the clustering exercise
would indeed be vulnerable to the critique that it is motivated by fiscal rather and
qualitative criteria.
We argue that the cluster concept may present an effective, user-focused
strategy to address some of the basic challenges of fragmentation that plague
modern systems of administrative justice. Clusters share several elements in
common with a trend toward system-wide amalgamation pioneered in Australia and
recently adapted in the UK, but tribunal clusters also have some unique features of
their own. Most significantly, the clustering strategy allows the administrative
justice system to retain a certain degree of flexibility and dynamism, with clusters
afforded the freedom to develop their own organisational cultures and institutional
mandates tailored to the particular needs, demands and capacities of the tribunals’
users groups and memberships. The cluster model also motivates tribunals to realise
these goals on a continuous basis, rather than locking tribunal organisation into a
particular pattern that will be unresponsive to the needs of its user populations in the
future.

Tribunal clusters have been contemplated in New Zealand and attempted in at least
one instance in the United States, but to our knowledge the cluster concept has not yet
been defined in any detail nor has it been the subject of a comparative analysis.11 We
think Ontario’s new Tribunals Act offers a good opportunity to do just that. In section
B of this paper we address the questions of why tribunal clusters might be useful
models for reform and when this strategy should be deployed to connect tribunals
within a cluster. We begin by reflecting on some of the core challenges that tribunal
modernisation and reform efforts seek to confront, each of which relate to existing
patterns of fragmentation in the delivery of administrative justice. We then connect
these patterns to some of the basic rationales behind the clustering strategy, and use
this context to assess what Ontario’s two new tribunal clusters reveal about the basis for
clustering. In section C we examine the tribunal cluster concept in more depth and
canvas the various factors that distinguish this approach from other reform strategies.
In section D, we draw on experiences with tribunal amalgamation in Australia to
produce some preliminary insights into various techniques that tribunal clusters
might employ to realise reform goals, and conclude with our view on the continued
evolution of the cluster model toward the ultimate destination of administrative justice.

B MODERNISING TRIBUNAL SYSTEMS

The goal of modernising administrative tribunal systems is ultimately to improve access
to justice for users.12 As the costs associated with traditional court-centred legal
processes have grown, so has the popularity of administrative tribunals in the view of
both policy makers and various user communities. Individuals are looking to these
tribunals as simpler and more economical avenues to review administrative decision
making and to resolve their disputes, free from the many formal trappings of the law

courts—a trend which is likely to continue as the cost of access grows as a concern, not
only for socially and economically disadvantaged individuals but also for the politically
significant middle class.13
Access to justice is, however, a heterogeneous ideal characterised by at least three
different dimensions of accessibility relevant to administrative justice reform.14 The
first of these is formal access to the tribunal process itself, as determined by
agency rules about legal standing to bring claims and by the procedures that
govern how a tribunal conducts its hearings. Second, access to legal or other
knowledge relates to whether and how individuals will be able to navigate the tribunal
system and obtain services from a given tribunal. This type of access is influenced by
operational guidelines and policies, a tribunal’s use of language and the availability of
translation and assisted services, the ability to self-represent, the simplicity of a
tribunal’s procedures, and the availability of past decisions to the general public. Third,
access to the resources needed to participate in the tribunal system will be a core
consideration for many users. The level of resources required for authentic
participation in the tribunal system will depend both on the availability of subsidised
assistance and on the costs associated with

participation, including costs of

representation, administration fees, and the rules governing cost awards.
Unfortunately, even while individual administrative tribunals are promoted as
simpler, more efficient and more expert in particular subject matters than courts,
fragmentation within tribunal systems continues to thwart these basic dimensions of
access for users in several ways.15 Consider the low-income individual in Ontario
who faces a challenge in obtaining social benefits and is in a dispute with her landlord.
That individual needs to navigate both the Social Benefits Tribunal and the Landlord
Tenant Board’s procedures and rules. These two tribunals may operate in separate
buildings and use different forms. They may employ different styles of adjudication and
they may have divergent or even clashing organisational cultures. As a result, the user is

forced to navigate a set of institutional silos which impose high financial and
informational costs and likely impede the overall quality of justice services that the
tribunals can offer.16
The New Zealand Law Commission has reported a ‘lack of overall coherence’ in
many tribunal systems, making individual tribunals increasingly difficult for users to
understand and navigate as interrelated institutions, and vulnerable to claims that they
fail to deliver administrative justice in cost-effective ways.17 That conclusion echoes
earlier comments by Sir Andrew Leggatt in his review of the UK’s tribunals in 2001:
most tribunals [in the UK] are entirely self-contained, and operate separately from each other,
using different practices and standards. It is obvious that the term “tribunal system” is a
misnomer . . . each tribunal has evolved as a solution to a particular problem, adapted to one
particular area.18

One obvious outcome of this fragmented landscape is that the sheer number of
administrative

tribunals—each

with

their

own

physical

and

logistical

infrastructure—represents a considerable duplication of resources and prevents
smaller tribunals from achieving economies of scale.19 In a survey preceding its report
on tribunal reform, the New Zealand Law Commission counted over 100 specialist
tribunals and courts in that country alone,20 while Leggatt considered 70 different
tribunal bodies within the scope of his review.21 Despite opportunities for some tribunals
to share their resources many remain operating in isolation, likely in part because
each tribunal is or perceives itself to be limited by its enabling legislation and by
the associated mandates of a particular government ministry. Likewise, individual
tribunals are each responsible for designing and implementing their own practices and
procedures, making it difficult for users of more than one tribunal to access knowledge
and to operate between them. This can be particularly frustrating for users when a single
dispute concerns more than one tribunal—for example, where land use, planning and
environmental regulatory issues coincide.22

On a more basic level, the complexity of tribunal systems may impair public
awareness of which tribunals exist in the first place, what they do, and how to go about
accessing them.23 As the UK government acknowledged in its White Paper responding
to the Leggatt review:
existing systems of redress do not take people’s problems as a whole. Instead they break
them down into types and generally insist that people analyse what sort of redress they need and
choose the appropriate route. It is rather as if a travel agent insisted on knowing whether you
want to go by aeroplane, train or ferry before asking what your destination is.24

To the extent that fragmentation impairs the public’s understanding about
available options, potential users might never even find their way to the front door.
Empirical work by Hazel Genn and others also suggests that these barriers to
knowledge may disproportionately impact users who belong to marginalised groups.25
The ad hoc evolution of administrative tribunal systems has likewise created serious
discontinuities in how individuals’ legal rights are determined and has disrupted the
flow of knowledge between adjudicators themselves, ‘leading to a lack of consistency
and in some cases arbitrary decision-making’.26 Training standards for tribunal
members currently vary widely between different agencies, leading to inconsistent
opportunities for members to engage in professional development and learning. In
both procedural and substantive dimensions, the current landscape of public
administration also makes it difficult for adjudicators with different but interrelated
areas of expertise to interact and develop common understandings and approaches.
Combating fragmentation is therefore about more than maximising the efficiencies
of resource use; it is also fundamentally about improving the quality and consistency
of review to fulfill the guiding principle of procedural fairness.
Fragmentation similarly hinders first-instance decision-makers from learning more
effectively from the decisions of review tribunals. A more coherent system would
improve the quality of first-instance decisions by facilitating better feedback processes

from tribunal adjudication, allowing judgments from all related tribunals to inform
administrative decision making in the future. Certainly, some authors have questioned
whether appeal decisions issued by tribunals have traditionally had much effect on
the quality of first-instance decision making.27 Addressing the problems associated
with fragmentation in the tribunal system may be one response to this disconnect.
Over time, a system that fosters better first-instance decisions will tend to rely less
on appeals or judicial review, enhancing access to justice by lowering costs and the
time required to achieve a just outcome. Moreover, fragmentation in determining legal
rights likely makes it more difficult for tribunals to maintain decision-making
independence from their respective ministries. A system of atomised tribunal bodies
operating in relative isolation likely creates more opportunities for departmental capture
and makes it difficult to impose and regulate the shared principles of transparency
and openness that can flow from greater independence.

1 Responses to Fragmentation in Australia and the UK
Australia and the UK, as two large common law jurisdictions with a shared history
of administrative state expansion following the Second World War, provide helpful
comparative insights with respect to contemporary reforms in administrative justice.
System-wide reform efforts in these countries have attempted to address the various
aspects of fragmentation that plague modern administrative states. The earliest of
these initiatives was to establish the federal Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT)
in Australia in 1976 following a pioneering report by the Commonwealth
Administrative Review Committee chaired by Sir John Kerr.28 At that time, the Kerr
Committee sketched a picture of an administrative justice

system that was

uncoordinated, contained many gaps, and was not easily

understood by its

constituents.29 The ultimate product of the Committee’s report, the Administrative
Tribunals Act, created a generalist tribunal to review administrative decisions which

today has jurisdiction to conduct merits review under a wide variety of more than 400
Acts of the federal Parliament.30
The AAT also exercises an appellate function with respect to the decisions of a few
remaining specialist tribunals in the areas of social security and veterans’ benefits.31 In
1995, Australia’s Administrative Research Council recommended that the federal
government create a new two-tier Administrative Review Tribunal (ART) to replace
the AAT, providing for an internal appellate structure and further integration of the
remaining independent tribunals. Although the government accepted this proposal in
principle, resistance to the idea ultimately defeated legislation in 2003 that would have
realised the reforms.32
While a small number of specialist federal tribunals still exist in Australia, the
outcome of the AAT model has been to centralise merits review of first-instance
decisions within a single organisation that includes a membership of appointed judges,
lawyers, and experts in various fields such as medical practitioners, engineers and planners.
This ‘super tribunal’ model has been replicated at the State level in Australia, although
these tribunals have taken on a variety of different forms in practice. The jurisdiction
of the Victoria Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) extends beyond merits
review into human rights and some civil claims. The VCAT’s organisational structure
appears to be somewhat more nuanced compared to the AAT, and we draw several
parallels between VCAT’s model and that of tribunal clusters in Ontario later in this
paper. Western Australia’s State Administrative Tribunal was not established until
2004, but closely tracks the structure of the VCAT.33 Jurisdiction over merits review and
dispute settlement in New South Wales remains more fragmented compared to Victoria
and Western Australia, although the State’s Administrative Decisions Tribunal
(ADT), established in 1997, was designed to act as an amalgamated generalist review
body. Some of the differences between the VCAT and ADT models are discussed in more
detail below in section D.

Tribunal system reforms have also received considerable attention in the UK,
motivated most recently by Sir Andrew Leggatt’s review of the tribunal system in 2001.34
The Leggatt Report recommended that tribunals in the UK be collected together under
one umbrella and administered by a new agency reporting to the Lord Chancellor.35
That report received a favourable response from the government in its 2004 White
Paper.36 The White Paper addressed several core concerns raised by Leggatt,
including the physical accessibility of tribunal locations, access to process and
knowledge, the independence of tribunals from their sponsoring departments and the
overall quality of decision-making. The government also noted that some of the
barriers inhibiting reform were rooted in current patterns of organisation within the
system itself and observed that ‘present arrangements are highly fragmented, with each
department, agency or tribunal responsible for trying to make improvements within its
own sphere of operation’.37 These concerns proved serious enough to motivate political
intervention and

broad structural change. The UK Tribunals Service was

established as an ‘Executive Agency’ in April 2006, and the Tribunals, Courts and
Enforcement Act 2007 (TCEA) was enacted the following year, creating a single,
unified agency with a two-tiered structure beginning in November 2008.38 To lead this
new agency, the TCEA provides for a Senior President of the Tribunal Judiciary
charged with taking account of the need for tribunals to be accessible, fair, quick,
efficient, expert in their subject matter, and innovative in developing methods to resolve
disputes.39 Most recently, in 2011, the Tribunals Service joined with the Courts Service
to form Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service (HMCTS). This body operates
under a Framework Agreement between the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice
and the Senior President of Tribunals to support the administration of both courts
and tribunals in the country.40
The two amalgamated tribunal bodies created under the TCEA parallel the
Australian reforms in the mid-1970s and subsequent refinements of that model at the

State level, although its two-tier structure appears to be unique in some respects.
The new First-tier Tribunal of HMCTS conducts first instance review of the decisions
of public administrators. It has acquired the jurisdiction of the bulk of administrative
tribunals in the UK, with the notable exception of the system of planning appeals,
which remains a distinct process.41 The Upper Tribunal was established to rationalise
the ‘haphazard’ network of appeal routes from first instance tribunals under the old
system,42 and also exercises statutory jurisdiction to conduct judicial review. Each of
these two tribunals retain a degree of specialisation within different ‘Chambers’,
though judges and tribunal members can be cross-appointed between these divisions.
The First-tier Tribunal consists of seven different chambers—Social Entitlement;
Immigration and Asylum; Health, Education and Social Care; War Pensions and
Armed Forces Compensation; Tax; General Regulatory; and Land, Property and
Housing—

with each having a Chamber President appointed by the Judicial

Appointments Commission. The Upper Tribunal has four chambers: Administrative
Appeals; Immigration and Asylum; Tax and Chancery; and Land. The Upper
Tier’s Chamber Presidents, other than that of the Land Chamber, are appointed by the
Lord Chief Justice.43
In practice, Peter Cane observes that the new organisation of tribunal adjudication
in the UK most closely reflects the two-tiered model proposed by Australia’s
Administrative Research Council in the mid-1990s but later abandoned by the
Australian government.44 The outcome for the UK, Cane argues, is a system not
unlike that of conventional law courts. Australia, at least at the federal level, has so far
resisted this trajectory in favour of model that sees amalgamated tribunal agencies as a
‘distinct genus of adjudicatory institution’ that seek to maintain their pragmatic
advantages in terms of speed, affordability and informality.45
At root, each of these responses can be understood as attempts to re-imagine
individual tribunals as part of a coherent and continuous system of administrative justice.

That perspective has taken some time to catch hold in Canada. According to Heather
McNaughton:
it was not until recently that governments and Canadian courts have started to conceptualise
administrative tribunals dealing with such disparate interests as the protection of fundamental
human rights, the issuance and transfer of quota for production of agricultural products, and
property tax assessment, as being part of a system of justice.46

One of the authors has traced this emerging view of administrative justice in
Canada’s Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, and the place of administrative decisionmakers within Canada’s constitutional order.47 Michael Adler has labeled this an
‘administrative justice approach’ which recognises the important

role of courts,

tribunals, ombudsmen and other external redress mechanisms but also emphasises
internal means of enhancing administrative decisions such as recruitment, training
and appraisal processes, as well as standard setting and quality assurance systems.48
That perspective represents a common thread among administrative justice
reforms in several jurisdictions internationally. In its White Paper, the UK
government acknowledged that ‘the sphere of administrative justice . . . embraces not
just courts and tribunals but the millions of decisions taken by thousands of civil
servants and other officials.’49 Tribunal reforms should, according to this view,
concentrate on more than the final stage of dispute resolution, they should take into
account the entire process ‘from the initial decision onwards’.50
A countervailing consideration to whole system reform is that administrative
tribunals must retain a degree of flexibility in order to accommodate and support their
particular mandates and areas of expertise. McNaughton cautions that ‘[t]he
temptation to one size fits all reforms fails to take into account the fact that the specialist
areas delegated to administrative tribunals form the very basis for their existence in the
first place.’51 The main challenge of tribunal reform might thus be seen as an attempt
to modernise and rationalise administrative tribunal

systems while respecting,

maintaining and promoting core principles of accessibility, pragmatism, and expediency.
The key is to make the system coherent while keeping it ‘nimble’.52

2 Why Tribunal Clusters?
The need to strike a balance between system coherence and flexibility speaks to what is
probably the tribunal cluster’s greatest promise as an ‘alternative’ strategy

for

administrative justice reform. In 2008, the New Zealand Law Commission produced
a comprehensive report that evaluated tribunal clusters as one of six possible options
for reorganising administrative tribunals at the national level. The Commission’s
starting point to define tribunal clusters was to emphasise their ability to adapt to
changing circumstances:53
There is no abstract definition of the concept of a cluster. The idea of a cluster does not compel
any particular level of integration or sharing of services . . . Rather, the cluster model can be
designed in a nuanced way, reflecting the level of connectedness that is desired for each
different cluster. We stress too that the extent of connection need not be the same for each
cluster within the reform. There may, for example, be one cluster where the tribunals are
closely connected in terms of common membership and procedures. This cluster may even
merge some of the individual tribunals’ jurisdictions. On the other hand, another cluster could
be a far looser grouping, with individual tribunals maintaining their own identities, sharing
fewer members and having greater procedural variance among themselves.

The Commission appeared to view the cluster concept as a central organising idea
capable of accommodating the various functional objectives of reformers and the
differing capacities of constituent tribunals. The Commission also saw that tribunal
clusters should be principally designed to reinforce connections between existing
tribunals based on their respective strengths and advantages. This search to identify
and support the successful aspects of existing tribunals— rather than exclusively
targeting current problems or shortfalls—is a significant

departure from the

conventional wisdom that administrative tribunal reforms should mainly be focused
on wiping away the system’s chaotic past and starting with an entirely clean slate.54
On this view, what sets tribunal clusters apart from other strategies is that they are
functionally designed to create the conditions for setting standards of excellence,
improving the relationship between user groups, streamlining tribunal administration,
and cross-pollinating approaches to adjudication across different areas of expertise. The
more interesting question is therefore not ‘why tribunal clusters?’ but rather ‘why
clusters and not simply “super-tribunals” like the AAT and VCAT in Australia or an
integrated Tribunal Service as in the UK?’ In other words, if bigger is better, why take
the half measure of creating a cluster? In our view, there are three important reasons
why clusters make sense compared to the strategies employed in Australia and the
UK. First, bigger may not always be better. Clusters allow tribunals, government
and independent reviewers and academics alike to put that proposition to the test.
For example, large-scale amalgamations may trade off flexibility and adaptability
within the supertribunal in return for greater conformity across the organisation.
Second, clusters allow for learning across and between tribunals. Tribunals previously
in relationships with separate ministries can, in one cluster, highlight the best
practices and procedures from each in order to give the cluster a distinct identity.55 Third,
the structure of tribunal clusters may accurately reflect how users actually
experience justice problems in some circumstances. National civil legal needs surveys
conducted in several countries over the past decade have confirmed that recognisable
patterns emerge in the ways that individuals experience multiple issues.56 The surveys
reveal that specific problems tend to cluster together— meaning that, for example,
an individual who experiences a housing problem would be more likely to also
encounter challenges related disability benefits.57 Tribunals will adjudicate many of
these clustered subject matters. This survey data suggest that tribunal systems might
be more effective at addressing administrative justice problems if they are structured

to reflect the underlying needs of their users. Tribunal clusters offer one means of
moving toward this outcome.
That said, in our view, tribunal clusters are not a final destination for administrative
justice reform; rather, they are a means for arriving at a more rational and coherent
way of delivering administrative justice. This fluidity is, moreover, exactly what many
tribunal systems may require to help them meet the complex challenges of
fragmentation discussed above. Tribunal clusters are motivated by the idea that
systemic reforms should concentrate on working out the most coherent system, in
practice, on an ongoing basis.
While some might regard their open-endedness as a liability for new clusters, others
will see this as an inherent strength of the clustering model. By requiring the decisionmakers who are responsible for defining each cluster to confront the extant features of
the group’s constituent tribunals, the cluster concept challenges leadership within the
system to focus on areas for change or reform, but also on the strengths and best
practices that have been developed by each tribunal in the past. A core tension within
tribunal clusters is, and will likely continue to be, between recognising the separate
statutory mandates of each constituent tribunal on the one hand and encouraging
deeper substantive and procedural integration on the other. There is no doubt that the
structural and organisational redesign of tribunals in the absence of substantive
legislative reform represents one of the biggest challenges for cluster models. But
placing too much emphasis on this tension is likely to detract from more pertinent
questions: What areas of knowledge from each tribunal—substantive, normative,
procedural—should be nourished and promoted across the cluster with reference to
improving access to justice, what features of individual tribunals ought to be left
unchanged, and what aspects are good targets for institutional reform? This approach is
rooted in the notion that tribunals will bring valuable institutional knowledge that is
worth being preserved and shared within the cluster, as well as challenges and

problems in need of reform.

3 When to Cluster?
Our conceptual starting point leads back to the question of when and on what basis it
will be appropriate to group existing tribunals together within a cluster. Recall that
Ontario’s Tribunals Act authorises the province to designate two or more adjudicative
tribunals as a cluster if ‘the matters that the tribunals deal with are such that they can
operate more effectively and efficiently as part of a cluster than alone’.58 Does this
reference to the ‘matters that the tribunals deal with’ suggest that each tribunal’s
core jurisdiction should be a central focus when designating a cluster? Whitaker’s
original Agency Cluster Project report seems to reinforce this interpretation, suggesting
that clustered tribunals should work in related areas and deal with related subject
matter.59 But read in context of the pragmatic rationales that underpin clustering and
its inherent flexibility as a reform strategy, a more expansive interpretation of the
Tribunals Act seems warranted.
Taken as a whole, these rationales imply that the overriding orientation of
clustering should be instrumental rather than formalistic—that is, tribunals should
be clustered whenever it is ‘efficient’ and ‘effective’ to do so. Such an instrumental
approach no doubt requires policy makers to consider the subject matter of constituent
tribunals in some cases, but also points to the character of tribunals’ user communities
and to procedural, adjudicatory or administrative similarities as equally significant
factors in deciding when it is appropriate to form a tribunal cluster.60 This approach
also raises the interesting question of when it would not be efficient and effective for
tribunals to cluster. One answer may be where a tribunal itself is already the product
of amalgamation and so enjoys many of the benefits of clustering (for example, the
Ontario Financial Services Tribunal was created through merging smaller tribunals
responsible for pensions and insurance, while the Ontario License Appeals Tribunal

similarly arose through an amalgamation of smaller licensing tribunals).
The two tribunal clusters formed under the Tribunals Act to date tend to
support our instrumental interpretation of the Act, and the particular foundation of each
cluster appears likely to vary depending on both the circumstances in and the goals for
which each cluster is formed. Environment and Land Tribunals Ontario (ELTO) was
the province’s first tribunal cluster, formally minted in April 2010 out of the five
participant tribunals in the Agency Cluster Project: the Assessment Review Board,
which deals with property tax assessment and tax appeals, the Board of Negotiation,
which

provides

expropriations,

mediation
the

in

compensation

Conservation

Review

disputes

Board,

arising

from

land

which adjudicates disputes

concerning designated heritage status properties and archaeological

sites,

the

Environmental Review Tribunals, which handles a range of environmental disputes, and
the Ontario Municipal Board, which hears appeals and applications on a wide range of
municipal, planning and land-related matters. Following the Cluster Project and before
the Tribunals Act was enacted, these tribunals were co-located in a common physical
space and began to integrate some aspects of their administrative operations. ELTO’s
formal designation as a cluster followed the appointment of an Executive Chair, who is
also a cross-appointed member of each tribunal in the cluster, in November 2009 and the
passage of the Tribunals Act that Fall.61
ELTO’s tribunals deal with closely connected subject matters in the land and
environment

areas—two

domains

that

increasingly

overlap

as

regimes

of

environmental planning, conservation, and land use zoning control have become
prominentfeaturesof Ontario’sregulatorylandscape.62 ELTO’susercommunities, on the
other hand, are very likely to be highly segmented, and in some instances its user
groups represent directly competing interests. Indeed, environmental regulators and
conservation groups have frequently clashed with land developers over a range of
concerns on the contested terrain of ‘sustainable development’. This concept provides

a prominent example of one subject matter that cuts across most if not all of ELTO’s
tribunals.
In a recent article, Michael Gottheil, former Executive Chair of ELTO, and Doug
Ewart, ELTO’s Senior Advisor, indicate that a key focus in the new cluster has been to
reinforce connections between the tribunals’ subject matters and contexts, and to
promote the sharing of knowledge, experience and perspectives between constituent
tribunals.63 ELTO is a good example of a cluster where the nature of the tribunals and
their respective mandates offer good possibilities for innovations that improve the
quality and consistency of decision-making on merits review, leading to better
outcomes for tribunal users.
A second set of six Ontario tribunals was recently brought together as part of Social
Justice Tribunals Ontario (SJTO) in January 2011. This cluster includes the Human
Rights Tribunal of Ontario, the Child and Family Services Review Board, the Custody
Review Board, the Social Benefits Tribunal/Social Assistance Review Board, the
Special Education Tribunals (English and French) and the Landlord and Tenant
Board. In comparison to ELTO, SJTO’s tribunals deal with a much more diverse
range of subject matters and most share little in the way of substantive overlap, although
some, such as the Custody Review and Child and Family Review Boards, will likely
cultivate important subject matter connections.64

As the SJTO’s name itself suggests,

a primary motivation behind its formation has been to create a ‘single door’
institution for a shared community of users vulnerable to social injustice from a
range of causes such as discrimination, physical and mental disabilities and economic
disadvantage. The SJTO tribunals thus appear to have clustered around the socioeconomic characteristics and other identifying features of users, rather than the
particular subject matters dealt with by the tribunals.
Ontario’s two existing tribunal clusters indicate that the functional criteria of
efficiency and effectiveness will likely have different reference points depending on the

circumstances in which the cluster is formed. ELTO’s experience reveals that subject
matter jurisdiction will be central in some instances, while the new SJTO suggests that
common characteristics of the cluster’s user communities will be a main focus in others.
The New Zealand Law Commission has suggested that reformers should also pay
attention to the nature of tribunals’ adjudicatory powers when contemplating how to
group like tribunal together.65 The Commission noted that the core function of
some tribunals is to review government decision-making, and distinguished these
from other bodies dealing with inter partes disputes.
The Commission’s study was careful to observe that the aspirations of each
tribunal cluster, as well as the challenges it seeks to address, should shape how that
cluster is designed. It also underscored the contested implications of ‘expertise’.
Administrative lawyers frequently refer to the expertise of adjudicators in a particular
field of knowledge, but rarely acknowledge expertise in certain procedures or
techniques. One can imagine situations in which members’ specialised knowledge of
subject areas converge (perhaps members from different tribunals all have a similar
background in land use planning), pulling toward a common set of procedures and
practices that would encourage cross-fertilisation between tribunals. But these same
members’ expertise in specific forms of disputeresolution processes might diverge
considerably, favouring more distinct procedural rules for each tribunal within the
cluster. Alternatively, the form of dispute-resolution itself, such as an emphasis on
inquisitorial processes or ADR techniques, rather than an adversarial approach, could
stand as yet another basis for forming a cluster out of tribunals.

C TRIBUNAL CLUSTER MODELS

Having outlined the basic motivations behind the tribunal cluster model, we next describe

the actual structure of tribunal clusters in their various forms. It is useful to situate
cluster-type arrangements along a spectrum that ranges from basic physical co-location of
like tribunals, to tribunal clusters, to fully integrated tribunal amalgamation. In reality,
actual tribunal clusters will tend not to occupy a specific point along this spectrum, but
will likely mix and match some features of each approach to create context-specific
arrangements.

1 Co-location
The most basic type of structural reform related to tribunal clusters is the colocation model, whereby tribunals are brought together to share the same physical
space and perhaps some overlapping logistical infrastructure. This model normally
entails a ‘single door’ approach that allows users of the co-located tribunals to attend at a
single location and gain information about the various procedures from constituent
tribunals. On the back-end, co-located tribunals will generally each retain leadership
and control over their own affairs, although some efficiencies in administrative
collaboration may be available. Given that co-location is basically about logistical reorganisation, this strategy can likely be employed without the need for new legislation
authorising the structure. The statutory mandate and membership of each co-located
tribunal in this model remain separate from those of other participating tribunals.
In Australia, Robin Creyke has noted both the possibilities and limitations
inherent in this approach:
The advantages of the co-location model are that it preserves the status quo, retains the flexibility
of a variety of specialist bodies, while permitting cost savings from use of a common registry
and administrative infrastructure. The disadvantages are that it perpetuates the complexity and
lack of coherence of the system, does not permit further savings other than those involved in
co-location, and enhances the possibility of tribunal capture by its respective agency. This first
option also denies the possibility for development of an administrative law jurisprudence across

tribunals on matters of common interest, such as, for example, the failure to notify citizens of
decisions, the minimum content of statements of reasons, the circumstances in which tribunals
can revisit their decisions, and when tribunals are estopped from acting.66

Creyke’s assumptions about the limitations of a bare co-location model may hold in
circumstances where there is little motivation to cultivate further connections between
tribunals, but her analysis appears to be overly pessimistic about opportunities for
procedural and substantive innovations insofar as they are applicable to clusters more
generally. Creyke’s assessment may also gloss over some of the important nuances that
can be built into co-location as one aspect of clustering. For example, considerations such
as office geography, discussed below, can yield important influences on the ability to
share knowledge and practices between tribunals.
While co-located tribunals lack some of the more sophisticated organisational
components granted to fully-fledged tribunal clusters, this model may represent a
valuable starting point for further reforms within and between participant tribunals.
Indeed, prior to the enactment of the Tribunals Act in Ontario, the five tribunals that
later formed Environment and Land Tribunals Ontario began the clustering process by
co-locating before becoming a cluster authorised under the new Act. Co-location may be
particularly relevant in the Canadian context where sole tribunals face significant
hurdles to provide adjudication outside of major urban areas. Co-located tribunals
could have economies of scale to offer adjudication in a wider number of centres, or
invest in better technology for remote access (such as video-conferencing) than sole
tribunals.
It will come as no surprise that physical co-location of tribunals is likely to be a
central feature of most tribunal cluster arrangements. But research from Australia
has gone further, to investigate the significance of designing the physical space within
which constituent tribunals are situated. Insights in this area often seem to flow from
basic common sense, but have apparently had an immediate impact on achieving the
objectives of tribunal reform in Australia.

In her research work on this topic, Rachel Bacon emphasises the importance of
shared spaces within the office environment, especially those in which the
membership can interact on a daily basis.67 This was a central design feature of the
VCAT’s new premises when they were designed for this new body. VCAT’s leadership
made a conscious choice to ‘mix up’ the office spaces of members from the former
specialist tribunals, with the expectation that this would contribute to breaking down
cultural barriers. A similar strategy appears to be underway at ELTO, where
adjudicators from all of the cluster’s tribunals have their offices on the same floor. This
arrangement encourages informal conversation and knowledge sharing between
adjudicators from different tribunals.68
Virtual co-location is also likely to be significant. This includes both public
websites that provide a single point of information access (even where the physical
locations of constituent tribunals remain separate) as well as internal electronic
information exchange and intranet sites that facilitate communication between
tribunals.

2 Institutionalising the Cluster
As with co-location, each tribunal brings to a cluster its distinctive statutory and/ or
policy mandate. But what sets clusters apart from bare co-location is the broader
organisational umbrella that cuts across these jurisdictional divides and encompasses
all tribunals within the group. Each tribunal cluster is an institution in its own right, with
a shared leadership and administrative staff, memberships of adjudicators, and
constituencies of users that are connected or overlap in identifiable ways. The
cluster model offers the unique opportunity for these organisations to develop their
own culture and adapt this to the particular needs and demands of their users over time.
Tribunal clusters may be characterised by differing levels of complexity in each of these
elements. Simpler clusters may operate as relatively horizontal organisations under a

single Executive Chair, without additional sub-groupings of related tribunals. These
clusters will likely occupy a single location and have a single set of shared procedures.
Simple clusters will inevitably prove to be the most straightforward to establish and
administer, with minimal disruption of existing tribunals who form part of the cluster.
More complex clusters might contain additional layers or higher-order levels of
organisation as a way of variably defining the cluster’s connections according to subgroupings. For example, tribunals within a sub-group at one level may share related
subject-matter jurisdictions, while that sub-group as a whole might share adjudicatory
techniques with other sub-groups in the cluster. Alternatively, levels within a nested
cluster might represent increasing areas of generality in subject-matter jurisdiction—for
example, between environmental matters at one level and between environment and
land-use matters at another. This type of model raises questions about tradeoffs between
greater organisational complexity and the ability to define subgroups to create a more
fine-grained structure. These sub-groupings may make

the process of drawing

connections between tribunals more straightforward and coherent, given that the needs
and functions of some tribunals will fit more or less comfortably with each of the others
in the cluster. However, greater complexity will invariably make the cluster more
challenging to lead and administer, may increase cost, and may pose a risk to a unified
organisation insofar as subgroupings create the possibility to form sub-cultures that
entrench old ways of doing things rather than promote communication and knowledge
sharing. Clusters will rarely remain static—rather, they may grow in complexity or
simplicity over time in response to internal and external dynamics.
Washington State’s Environmental Hearings Office (EHO) provides a good case
study as to how a cluster model might evolve over time. Prior to reforms put into action
in July 2011, the EHO housed a collection of five regulatory appeals boards dealing
mainly with environmental controls and permits: Pollution Control Hearings,
Shorelines

Hearings,

Forest

Practices

Appeals,

Hydraulic

Appeals,

and

Environmental and Land Use Hearings. Together, these boards heard appeals from
regulatory orders and decisions made by the Department of Ecology, the Department
of Natural Resources, by local governments and by other agencies as provided by
law. The Boards derived their jurisdiction from different governing statutes and
designed their own practices and procedures. However, the boards were co-located,
members of some boards were available to be cross-appointed between tribunals, and the
overall structure of EHO admitted a degree of administrative and logistical integration.
EHO’s original structure provided for a ‘level field’ on which each tribunal
enjoyed—at least, formally—an equal position within the organisation. This idea of
formal equality supports the overall purpose of a cluster in which tribunals retain and
cultivate their own areas of expertise, while promoting shared knowledge and crossfertilisation between each unit. But the formal equality between tribunals within the
cluster might also mask informal or operational hierarchies that create significant
distinctions in the roles and influence of different tribunals. EHO’s experience in this
regard is instructive. While that cluster was formally composed of five different boards, it
appears that the Pollution Control Hearings Board (PCHB) was by far the most
prominent tribunal within the cluster. The PCHB heard the largest proportion of cases
coming to the EHO, its chair also sat as the head of the Shorelines Hearing Board, and
he or she was the de facto director of the cluster’s administrative operations, although
there is no common chair on the adjudicative side. Similar kinds of informal dynamics
may influence the outcomes of possible structural reforms discussed in section D, below.
For example, shared practices and an organisational culture that promotes active input
from members of each tribunal in the cluster may be aimed creating greater equality
between tribunals.
State legislative changes enacted in March 2010 laid the groundwork to
reorganise Washington’s system under a new cluster-type arrangement called the
Environment and Land Use Hearings Office (ELUHO).69 The new ELUHO is

composed of two departments dealing with land use and environmental hearings
respectively.70 A preliminary question about the evolution from EHO to ELUHO is
whether

the

environment

and

land

sub-groupings

will

be

largely

formal

organising concepts or whether this arrangement will have significant practical
implications for operating the cluster. The enabling legislation for the new cluster leaves it
open as to whether the environment boards will have a common chair or individual
chairs. It appears that a Chair responsible for the operation of the cluster as a whole
will be appointed from the membership of either the land or environment sections, but
that this Chair will not be cross-appointed to sit on tribunals for both sections.
Inevitably, this model raises the spectre of competing visions for the mandate of the
cluster—if a Chair from an environmental background is selected, will that suggest to
the land use tribunal community that a particular substantive approach will dominate the
cluster? In the case of ELTO, Ontario’s environment and land tribunal cluster, it is
significant that the first Executive Chair was chosen from a background that was in
neither the environmental or land use fields.71
Washington’s ongoing experience with tribunal reforms may offer a good
opportunity to track the evolution of a cluster model going forward. As we
discussed in section B, a key aspect of tribunal clusters is their flexibility to adapt to
changing needs and circumstances. ELUHO’s recent round of restructuring offers a
good illustration of how such clusters might change over time, and underscores the
opportunity for further inquiry into the factors that motivate or influence these
dynamics and their impact on access to justice for users.

3 Amalgamation
A third model illustrates the fluid boundary between tribunal clusters and more fully
integrated amalgams or ‘super tribunals’. Research into the actual structure and
operation of these so-called super tribunals demonstrates that there is often no clear

distinction between a single amalgamated tribunal with divisional subgroupings or lists
and a cluster of related tribunals that retain important aspects of their distinct
mandates within the overall structure.72 The existing literature on tribunal reform might
be criticised for obscuring this distinction by focusing almost explicitly on the concept
of amalgamation, while ignoring contrasting or alternative concepts of clustering, even
where the later would seem to be a more accurate label of the actual operation of the
organisation. Nonetheless, as we explain below, tribunal clusters can still draw important
lessons from this body of work. In this section we draw on two examples from
Australia to help illustrate how amalgamated tribunals can differ dramatically from
each other in practice, as we set the stage to apply insights derived from research on
Australia’s super tribunals in section D.
The VCAT and the ADT were created as State-level administrative bodies within
a year of each other in the late 1990’s. On their face, both bodies are the result of
system-wide attempts by their respective State governments to overhaul what was
considered to be an ad hoc collection of specialist tribunals to create a single unified
tribunal service, with a standard set of processes and a single public persona. The VCAT,
however, is likely closer in organisation to a complex cluster

than a unified

amalgamation. It is divided into three main divisions—Civil, Administrative, and
Human Rights—and each division is further sub-divided into subject matter lists.
The core functions of the VCAT are defined under the VCAT Act, while the
jurisdiction exercised by each list is conferred by portfolio legislation. The Civil and
Human Rights Divisions operate as ‘court substitutes’ to adjudicate claims that were
previously the domain of the Victorian Supreme Court, while the Administrative
Division handles the review of government decisions under a range of statutes. The
Administrative and Civil Divisions share one registry staff, excluding the Residential
Tenancy and Guardianship Lists, which are each serviced by their own registry.
While registry staff are divided into teams that service each list individually, tribunal-

wide managers retain the flexibility to borrow staff from other areas according to
workflow demands.73
The President of the VCAT is a Judge of the Supreme Court. Individuals with legal
qualifications dominate the VCAT’s membership, and each member is appointed
for a five-year fixed-term. Well over half of the VCAT’s members are cross-appointed
to more than one list. The Tribunal has discretion to regulate its own procedures,
making it possible to adapt these to specific proceedings and the requirements of
individual Lists. For example, the Guardianship List operates on

an informal,

inquisitorial basis, while complex tax matters are adjudicated in an adversarial manner,
usually involving legal representatives. The VCAT’s flexibility to design its own
procedures also allows it to implement some uniform operating procedures across the
tribunal as a whole in order to promote shared approaches in some areas.74
Compared to the VCAT, the ADT retains something of a dual personality as both a
closely unified amalgam and a disjointed organisation within which its division retain
separate and distinct memberships and procedures. In many respects, the overall
organisation of the ADT is closer to a unified amalgam than a tribunal cluster. Much
of the ADT’s work takes place within the General Division, which includes claims
from a wide range of subject matters. The ADT also maintains a central registry
responsible for the tribunal as a whole, and its enabling legislation offers relatively
few opportunities to adapt tribunal-wide procedures to different divisions and
circumstances. But in other respects, the ADT resembles a loose collection of
tribunals and divisions that operate in isolated spheres of jurisdiction and practice.
Divisional units such as the Community Services (child services and adoption
regulations) and the Retail Leases Divisions, retain the distinctive identities of their
previously independent tribunals. Cross-appointments between the ADT divisions
are infrequent and certainly less common compared to the VCAT. Many of the current
fragmentation problems at the ADT have been traced back to this lack of cross-

appointments and shared knowledge.75
In the end, semantic distinctions between broad-scale and generic tribunal clusters
like VCAT and unified, or sometimes fragmented, bodies such as ADT are much less
significant than the lessons which can be gleaned from studying the implications that
flow from their various structural and procedural differences. The purpose of section
D is to unpack these various structural components of tribunal clusters.

D LESSONS AND NEXT STEPS

A review of the existing literature on tribunal reform internationally reveals that very
little work has been done that evaluates ‘best practices’ applicable to the cluster
concept—either on its own or in comparison to other reform options. In other words,
while it is interesting and worthwhile to compare reform models, in the absence of a
comprehensive comparative literature that evaluates various models, is there a basis to
prefer one over another? The academic literature which exists may be helpful in this
regard. For example, in her doctoral thesis on amalgamating administrative
tribunals, Rachel Bacon discusses specific

outcomes of structural change in

Australia over several key features for tribunal reform. Bacon’s project gathers lessons
from her fieldwork, including first-person interviews of tribunal members and
participants, to compare reform outcomes of the VCAT and the ADT in New South
Wales. The following discussion attempts to translate relevant insights from this
project into useful lessons for tribunal clusters in Ontario.
At the outset we can identify a number of general components that are likely to
determine the ultimate character of a particular cluster arrangement. In its 2008 study
on tribunal reform, the New Zealand Law Commission identified six basic components
of cluster models, including: shared administrative support and

services, shared

membership (ie cross-appointed adjudicators), a common approach to procedures, and
a cohesive overall leadership of the cluster.76 At least one additional feature might be
added to this list. Physical co-location is very likely to be a feature of cluster
arrangements. Indeed, co-location, as in ELTO’s case, may precede a more formal
reorganisation of tribunals into a cluster. But additional aspects of the cluster’s
physical space are also relevant, including office-space geography and the inclusion of
shared spaces to increase membership interaction.
We also note two further components of tribunal clusters that are not discussed in
detail below, but which we flag for future research: (i) educational mechanisms for crosstraining members who sit on different tribunal within the cluster (as a means of
enhancing quality, sharing experience, and developing a shared administrative culture)
and (ii) the appointments process by which tribunal members are selected in the first
place (so that the needs of the cluster, rather than its constitutive tribunals, may come to
guide the process, including a commitment to transparent criteria, an emphasis on
cross-appointments or lateral expertise,

and an optimal balance of skills and

backgrounds).
At a more general level, we assume that tribunal clusters will aim to cultivate a
shared organisational culture, which might include an overarching mission/ vision
statement and common standards of excellence for tribunals within the group. The
accountability documents now required under the Tribunals Act in Ontario require
each cluster to develop and make public service standards, publish an MOU with
the Government, an annual report and a variety of ethics documents (conflict of interest
codes, etc).77
A shared organisational culture will necessarily be shaped by and interrelated to
other aspects of the cluster, such as the presence of a strong unified leadership and
knowledge and information sharing between members. As Bacon observes:
features such as the level of interaction between members are both a manifestation and an

underlying cause of the organisational culture within an amalgamated tribunal. This indicates
that, far from being an inexorable given, organisational culture is something that, to some
extent, can be controlled and engineered with positive effect.78

Overall, Bacon’s study concludes that the VCAT had been more successful at
capitalising on structural and procedural reforms to implement new mechanisms that
improve access to justice compared to the ADT in New South Wales. The ADT had
devolved into what Bacon calls a ‘disjunctive institutional culture’, in which relatively
disconnected parts of the organisation operate at varying levels of formality, make
arbitrary decisions about workload distribution and caseassignments to members, and
have little or no adherence to a common vision for the organisation as a whole. Despite
the fact that the ADT appears to be organised more closely along the lines of a unified
structure, the lines between previously independent tribunals often remain rigid
barriers to knowledge transfer and the development of procedural innovations.79 By
contrast, some of the benefits that Bacon observes from VCAT’s experience are:
increased consistency in decisionmaking where members interact frequently to
share knowledge and ideas; increased member and staff satisfaction, leading to
better productivity; a more functional organisation overall, adherence to a common set
of values and shared aims; and an improved public profile for all tribunals or
units within the organisation, leading to increased independence from government
and greater legitimacy in the public view.

1 Shared rules, procedures and practices
One way to measure the effectiveness of tribunal clustering for streamlining and
improving cluster-wide procedures is to track the diffusion of specific practices within
the cluster. Bacon uses the example of how Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
techniques have been adopted and applied within different VCAT Lists following the
initial amalgamation.80 Particular divisions, such as the Planning List, which had

previously used mediation practices infrequently saw a dramatic increase in the use of
mediation after the VCAT was formed.
Bacon attributes the spread in mediation practice at VCAT to at least three causes.
First, informal member communications were a main source of diffusion, linked to
increased

opportunities

for members

to interaction.81 Second,

the

VCAT’s

leadership designed a periodic mediation newsletter to formalise some aspects of
information sharing. Third, the VCAT appointed a Principle Mediator with a mandate
for promoting the use of mediation throughout the organisation, such as by organising
meetings and information sessions and inviting guest speakers to present to the
membership.
The ‘spread’ of these types of practices is a good example of how the idea of
institutional memory inherent to the cluster concept can be used to promote
positive reforms. For example, those tribunals coming into the cluster with a strong
foundation in mediation practices can be tapped as a primary resource for promoting
similar practices throughout the cluster. This feature suggests important benefits in
the context of Ontario, where ADR practices tend to vary widely between tribunals.

2 Shared membership and cross appointments
Bacon’s research finds at least two benefits of cross-appointing members between
tribunal lists or divisions. The primary benefit was that cross-appointments created a
means of breaking down some of the cultural barriers between separate subject-matter
divisions by encouraging members to share knowledge, be open to new learning, and
actively participate in the process of cultural change. The VCAT and ADT diverged
widely on this feature, with cross-appointments being far more common in the VCAT.
Bacon attributes much of the VCAT’s success to innovations in cross-appointing
members.82
Field interviews with tribunal members indicated that changes on this front started

small and grew gradually as new norms start to emerge. At the initial stage, crossappointments may simply lead to a greater recognition and comprehension of areas of
overlap between units (ie tribunals within a cluster). For example, after VCAT
members were cross-appointed to the Guardianship List, these members began to
quickly identify guardianship issues in hearings on matters from different lists,
particularly when dealing with problems faced by elderly people and people with
disabilities in areas such as residential tenancies. Recognition was then followed, over
time, with attempts on behalf of members to provide active assistance or direction for
those with issues or problems that fell across two or more Lists.
A secondary benefit of cross-appointments is that they are likely to create better
incentives to attract high-quality tribunal members. Bacon reports that the ability to sit as
a cross-appointed member increased these adjudicators’ job satisfaction and contributed
to improved career opportunities.83
Issues related to full versus part time membership are also relevant here. Where a main
objective of clustering is to share knowledge and effect cultural change across
constituent tribunals, Bacon’s findings indicate that these processes may be facilitated by
more full time as opposed to part time members. The reasons given by members at
VCAT and ADT are relatively straightforward. Full time members will increase the
ability of the membership overall to develop and retain corporate knowledge because
they are more actively involved in the day-to-day works of the cluster. The increased
physical presence of full time members also makes it easier to organise member training
and meetings, and creates greater opportunities for informal exchanges between
individuals.
There can also be negative impacts, however, from decreasing the number of parttime members. The main challenge flagged in Bacon’s research was that full time
members in highly specialised areas might find it more difficult to retain their
specialised expertise and skills in that field, given that they are unable to be

actively involved in actual practice.84 In professional areas such as engineering and
land use planning, this could result in a growing disconnect between full time
members’ knowledge/experience and the realities faced by

the tribunals’

constituencies.

3 Shared administrative support and services
The VCAT and the ADT have apparently been equally successful at developing shared
administrative services to suit their particular needs. But notably, positive outcomes
such as improved efficiency, better staff training and development, and greater flexibility
in mobilizing staff and resources to meet fluctuating workloads appear to be the result
of both convergence and divergence at the administrative level.
On the one hand, trends at both the VCAT and ADT toward case-based
management systems common to all sections or lists within the tribunals represent a focus
on ‘multi-skilling’ for individual staff members. This approach emphasises exposing
individuals to a range of experiences on all aspects of a case, from beginning to
end. On the other hand, the VCAT has retained some specialised administrative
processes necessary to account for significant difference between Lists. For example,
the VCAT has maintained two parallel electronic case management systems—one
for the Residential Tenancies List and one for the rest of the Tribunal. The reason for
this distinction is the very high caseload of the Residential Tenancies List, which
handles more than 70,000 applications per year.85
It is, of course, not necessary to have a formal cluster in order to realise these kinds
of administrative efficiencies. Ontario’s Health Boards (the Health Professions Appeal and
Review Board and the Health Services Appeal and Review Board) are not in a cluster but
are supported by a shared secretariat through the Ministry of Health.

4 Leadership
A main issue related to tribunal cluster leadership is the nature and degree of
authority over each of the constituent tribunals. In tribunal clusters, central
leadership will likely be the crucial pivot point in balancing between the cohesion of
distinct sub-cultures and fostering the distinctiveness of constituent tribunals.
Contrasting experiences at the VCAT and the ADT in this respect serve to
illustrate the importance of strong leadership to make the cluster model successful. The
VCAT’s original president, a Supreme Court judge, has been credited with playing a
central role in the organisation’s success. Bacon attributes this result to the VCAT
president’s personal commitment and vision, but also to the broad scope of
discretion afforded to the president to shape the tribunal’s procedures and other
structural features in response to demands of the tribunal’s users.86 By comparison, the
ADT’s leader—similarly a judicial officer—was much more severely constrained in
making important decisions about procedure and the structure of the ADT itself
following amalgamation. For example, the ADT president held very limited power to
cross-appoint members between divisions. This resulted in weak cohesion between
the previous tribunals and severely curtailed the organisation’s ability to formulate a
common vision and standards. Challenges facing the leadership of many tribunal
clusters may of course be even greater than those recognised in Bacon’s study of the
VCAT and the ADT, both of which have been designed in a detailed way to centralise
decision-making power around a core executive. The scope of reforms in these
jurisdictions, as well as the lens and language of tribunal amalgamation, create a
default orientation toward strong leadership. Indeed, at first, the only concrete reality
which makes a cluster a cluster may be the appointment of an Executive Chair (Social
Justice Tribunals Ontario may be an example of this phenomenon). The nature of
leadership roles within a cluster will also depend on the degree to which an
Executive Chair is significantly involved in the administration of the tribunals, and on

the possibilities for associate chairs of each tribunal to take on aspects of corporate and
jurisprudential leadership.87 For example, in Ontario the Tribunals Act permits the
appointment of associate chairs, but does not make them mandatory, implying
that the statute does not necessarily predetermine the particular roles of these
leadership positions, where they exist, within the cluster. The leadership structure of
these clusters will need to reflect evolving administrative and jurisprudential demands,
both of the cluster as a whole and of
particular tribunals, as they take shape.
To conclude, in the search for best practices, the experience of jurisdictions such as
Australia provides tangible direction. Such best practices include:
§ Shared rules, procedures and practices such as mediation/ADR;
§ Shared administrative and support services, as well as physical co-location;
§ Cross-appointments and the development of a common administrative culture;
§ Strong, cohesive leadership of the organisation.
Given that structural reforms tend to fall along a spectrum (from co-location to
tribunal clusters to amalgamation), policy makers should expect that opportunities to
learn from experiences in other jurisdictions will continue to arise, even where reform
strategies take on different forms. For example, recent changes in the UK, discussed
above, may provide yet another comparative Commonwealth model that tribunal
clusters can triangulate with as clusters continue to evolve.
We turn now to the conclusion and move from a comparative and empirical
analysis of cluster realities on the ground to some preliminary normative reflections
on where the evolution of clusters ought to head in Ontario, Canada more broadly, and
elsewhere.

E CONCLUSIONS
The question Ontario’s administrative justice and government communities now wrestles
with is: ‘Why clusters?’
The legislation containing the power to create such clusters, the Tribunals Act, is
silent on their purpose. This silence is puzzling. Some clusters may be justified by
shared subject matter (such as ELTO), while others may be justified by common
qualities among parties before a cluster (such as the rights seekers involved in the
SJTO), but neither cluster was handed a mandate in which this rationale, or any
rationale, was made apparent.
If you take the problem with administrative justice to be fragmentation, a lack of
accessibility, duplication of resources, complexity of mandates and rules, and the lack
of structural protections of independence or requirements of accountability, then
clusters seem a half-measure at best. Why not bring all adjudicative tribunals
together into a single amalgamated structure with different subject-matter sub-divisions,
as in the UK? Clusters appear to mitigate rather than solve the problem of tribunals
being caught up in ministerial silos, unable to coordinate, learn from each other or
engage in economies of scale with respect to accessibility initiatives (like a common
pool for translation and interpretation services).
The very existence of a cluster suggests an ambivalence—big is better but not too
big! There is, indeed, a quintessentially Canadian dimension to the half-way house of
clusters. While clusters are difficult to defend against ideological purists, they reflect the
kind of principled pragmatism that has fueled the development of administrative justice
in Canada.
The rhetoric surrounding the cluster initiative has cast it as a modernizing
project. But the very notion of modernising suggests a process rather than an end point.
While system coherence is a central goal of structural change, it may be overly
optimistic to think that we can achieve that goal with a single sweeping set of reforms.

Different tribunals and their groups of users may have different needs at different times,
and in our view some degree of flexibility to meet these varying needs is necessary.
We believe that it is impossible to discuss the risks and benefits of tribunal
clusters in a normative vacuum. A coherent and coordinated system of
administrative justice is better able to deliver access to justice, public accountability and
the fulfillment of statutory and policy objectives. It is for this reason that, in our view,
clusters represent an important and positive first step, rather than a destination. We
acknowledge that this is choosing to see the glass as half-full. Once clusters are in
existence, however, if further evolution does not come, all too soon, the glass may come
to appear half-empty!
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